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Abstract: ​Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many            
hold that it undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However,             
the case for skeptical theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered                
an explicit argument for the truth of skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to               
remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous argument for the truth (of             
one version) of skeptical theism. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many hold that it              
undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However, the case for skeptical              
theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered an explicit argument for the truth of                   
skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous                
argument for the truth (of one version) of skeptical theism. 
 
2. Skeptical Theism and Arguments from Evil 
 
Take some evil E. A God-justifying good for E is a good G that is such that God would 
(at least possibly) be justified in bringing about (or allowing) E for the sake of G. A good is a 
God-justifying good if and only if (i) it outweighs E and (ii) it could not have obtained without E 
(or something as bad as or worse than E) obtaining.  Some arguments from evil rely on 1
something like the following inference: 
 
(1) We know of no God-justifying good for an evil E. 
1 This is a standard understanding of God-justifying goods (what Michael Bergmann (2012) calls God-justifying 
reasons ​and what others call ​morally ​justifying reasons). See e.g. Rowe (1979: 336), where he says “an omniscient, 
wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without 
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”  and  Bergmann (2012: 11), where 
he says “a good state of affairs G—which might just be the prevention of some bad state of affairs E*—counts as a 
God-justifying reason for permitting an evil E if and only if (i) G’s goodness outweighs E’s badness and (ii) G 
couldn’t be obtained without permitting E or something as bad or worse.” (2012: 11, footnote 5) Many other 
philosophers operate with this understanding of a God-justifying good, see e.g.William Alston (1991), Daniel 
Howard-Snyder (1996), Hud Hudson (2014a), Stephen Maitzen (2014), William Rowe (1991), (1996), and (2006), 
and Michael Bergmann (2001) and (2012). 
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(2) Therefore, probably, there is no such good.  2
 
Since it is assumed that God’s existence is incompatible with ​gratuitous evil —evil for which 3
there is no God-justifying good—it follows that, probably, God does not exist.​ ​Skeptical theists 
reject the inference from premise (1) to (2): they claim that our (supposed) lack of knowledge of 
a God-justifying good does not render it probable that there is no such good, and hence this 
version of the argument from evil fails.  4
 
Skeptical theism comes in many varieties (for different examples, see Cullison 2014, 
DePoe 2017, Hudson 2013 and 2014a, and Wykstra 1984 and 1996). However, in this article, I 
will be exclusively concerned with one particular type of skeptical theism. For the purposes of 
this article, a skeptical theist is a monotheist that affirms the following thesis: 
 
SKEPTICISM​: We have no good reason to think that the goods and evils that we 
know are (causally)  connected to some instance of evil are representative, in 5
respect to their value, of the actual goods and evils that are connected to said 
instance of evil. (Hendricks 2018a: 116) 
 
Goods and evils are taken to be states of affairs, and different states of affairs have different 
values. Take some disvaluable (bad) state of affairs X. If a state of affairs Y outweighs X ​and ​Y 
could not have obtained without X, then Y (at least possibly) justifies one in allowing X. More 
exactly, one is justified in allowing X ​only if​ the total value of the ​set of states of affairs ​that are 
produced by X is greater than the total value of the set of state of affairs that would have 
obtained had X not occurred.  Thus, it is a necessary condition for God to be justified in allowing 
X that the sets of states of affairs produced by X are more valuable than the set of states of affairs 
produced by ~X.  In the terminology introduced above, if the set of states of affairs produced by 6
X is greater than the set produced by ~X, it is a God-justifying good. The inference from (1) to 
(2) claims that this necessary condition is probably not satisfied, and hence there is probably 
gratuitous evil, and hence God probably does not exist. 
 
2 The most prominent proponent of this inference is William Rowe (1979). 
3 ​While this assumption is common and will be taken for granted in this article, a growing number of philosophers 
reject it (see, for example, Hasker 2008, Rubio 2018, Mooney forthcoming, Sullivan 2013, and van Inwagen 2006). 
4 Skeptical theists have argued that skeptical theism undermines other arguments from evil as well, see e.g. 
Bergmann (2009) and Howard-Snyder and Bergmann (2004). 
5 There is some controversy as to whether a good being ​causally ​connected to an evil is sufficient for it to be a 
God-justifying good. While Kirk Durston (2000) thinks it is, Paul Draper (2013) and others think it is not—they 
hold that there must be a ​logical ​connection. However, my argument works for either view, as I illustrate in footnote 
9. 
6 It is implied here that the set of states of affairs produced by X could not have obtained via ~X. 
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So, in determining whether there is a God-justifying good for X, we need to know the 
total value of the set of states of affairs connected to X and the total of the set of states of affairs 
connected to ~X. As such, ​SKEPTICISM ​amounts to the claim that we have no good reason for 
thinking that the states of affairs that we know are (causally) connected to some instance of evil 
are representative, in respect to value, of the actual states of affairs (causally) connected to the 
prior mentioned instance of evil. Crucially, this (​SKEPTICISM​) entails that we have no good 
reason to think that the total value of the set of states of affairs that are actually connected to 
some instance of evil E fall within a particular range of value: if we have no good reason for 
thinking that the value of the states of affairs ​actually ​connected to E  fall within the same value 
range (are representative) of the states of affairs connected to E that we know of, then we have 
no good reason to think that the total value of the set of states of affairs actually connected to E 
falls within a particular value range. And if we have no good reason to think that the set of states 
of affairs actually connected to E fall within a particular value range, then we cannot infer that 
there probably is no God-justifying good for E, since to say that is to say that the total value of 
the set of states of affairs connected to E is probably lower than the total value of the set of states 
of affairs that would have come about if ~E obtained. (I illustrate this further at the end of 
section 3.2.) 
 
More abstractly, the reason many hold that ​SKEPTICISM ​undermines the inference from 
(1) to (2) is due to the idea is that an inductive inference is only justified if we have good reason 
to think that the sample one is inferring from is ​representative​. If we have no good reason to 
think the sample is representative, then the inductive inference it supports is unjustified. Some 
examples will help illuminate why this is so.  
 
Suppose that Mary, a scientist, conducted a study that (she claims) showed that drug D 
cured cancer in the patients that participated in the study. And suppose that Mary inferred from 
the fact that it cured the patients involved in her study that D would cure all cancer patients. 
However, suppose that Mary did not give any indication of the steps she took to ensure that her 
sample of cancer patients used in her study is representative of all cancer patients. And suppose 
further that when pressed in person, Mary did not produce any good reason for thinking that her 
sample of cancer patients is representative. In such a case, we should not accept the conclusion 
of her inference: while her conclusion may be correct, we are unjustified in accepting it on the 
basis of her inductive inference. 
 
Consider another example (borrowed from Hudson 2011 and 2014b): I suspect there is a 
rabbit in my garden, so I hire the A1 Rabbit Extermination Team to investigate. The team arrives 
and begins to look around for rabbits. After 20 minutes, they come and tell me that they have 
checked my garden and there are not any rabbits in it. “How do you know this?” I ask. They 
reply that they checked part of the garden and found no rabbits. They inferred from their finding 
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no rabbits in that part of the garden that there probably are not any rabbits in the whole garden. If 
they have good reason to think that the part of the garden they checked is representative of the 
whole garden in respect to rabbit population, then this inference is justified and I should be 
happy with the job they have done. I want to put my mind at ease, so before paying them for 
their work, I ask “Why should I think the section of the garden that you checked is 
representative? What steps did you take to ensure that it was?” In response, they give me no 
good reason to think that it is and are not able to tell me any steps they took to ensure that the 
section they checked is representative. I am not impressed by their response. The right move here 
is to hire a new pest control service. The A1 Rabbit Extermination Team has not given me good 
reason to think that they have done their job well: they have given me no good reason to think 
that there are no rabbits in my garden, and I am not justified in accepting their inference. Indeed, 
since they have no good reason to think that there are no rabbits in my garden, ​they ​are not 
justified in accepting their inference either. 
 
In respect to arguments from evil, and in particular the inference from premise (1) to (2), 
the question is whether our sample of goods and evils (i.e. states of affairs) we know of is 
representative. And the relevant property in respect to representativeness of our sample of goods 
and evils is the value of the goods and evils (state of affairs) we know of (see Hendricks 2018a). 
SKEPTICISM​, however, says that we have no good reason to think that our sample of goods is 
representative in respect to value. Hence, given that an inductive inference is only justified if we 
have good reason to think its sample is representative, ​SKEPTICISM ​undermines arguments from 
evil that rely on an inductive inference like the one above. While there is more to say about this 
normative premise, the purpose of this article is to show that ​SKEPTICISM ​is true, not defend the 
normative premise.  7
 
Obviously, only ​theists ​can be ​skeptical theists​. However, skeptical theists think that 
everyone, including atheists, should accept the skeptical component of skeptical theism. That is, 
skeptical theists think that everyone should endorse ​SKEPTICISM​, and hence everyone ought to 
reject (certain) arguments from evil. Unfortunately, reasons for endorsing ​SKEPTICISM​ run slim. 
To motivate ​SKEPTICISM​, sometimes we are given an analogy about parents and children (e.g. 
Wykstra 1984) or an analogy about rabbits and gardens (Hudson 2014b). Other times, we are 
reminded that humans are cognitively limited creatures (e.g. Alston 1989 and Bergmann 2001). 
However, these analogies and reminders will (likely) not pressure the anti-skeptical theist to 
adopt ​SKEPTICISM​: those who do not already endorse ​SKEPTICISM ​are unlikely to be persuaded 
by these analogies and reminders. Perhaps due to the tendency of skeptical theists to stay at the 
intuitive level, direct challenges to ​SKEPTICISM​ are difficult to come by, with Benton, 
Hawthorne, and Isaacs 2016 being an exception. (See Hendricks 2018a for a response). Below, I 
7 ​For more on this normative premise, see Alston 1989, Bergmann 2001, and Hudson 2006, 2014b, and 2017. 
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aim to remedy this situation: I will put forth an explicit argument for the truth of ​SKEPTICISM​, 
that shows that ​everyone ​ought to endorse it.  
 
2.1 Clarifying Scope: What I ​Will ​and Will ​Not ​Argue 
The topic of this article is concentrated exclusively on why we should endorse​ SKEPTICISM​. 
There are many other issues that pertain to skeptical theism and the problem of evil that I will 
simply gloss over. This is in part because these issues have been addressed elsewhere and in part 
because addressing those issues would take this article far astray from its central thesis. In this 
section, I will briefly make explicit the scope of this article. 
 
Since I have argued elsewhere (Hendricks 2018a) that ​SKEPTICISM​ is a plausible way to 
understand skeptical theism as it is advocated by Michael Bergmann (e.g. Bergmann 2001), I 
will not rehearse those arguments here. Instead, I will take for granted that ​SKEPTICISM 
approximates to the skeptical theism that Bergmann advocates. Additionally, I will not enter the 
ongoing debate about whether​ SKEPTICISM ​entails some sort of excessive skepticism. Many 
articles have been written on this issue, and it would take far too many words to do the problem 
justice.  What I ​will ​do in this article is this: I will put forth an argument for the truth of 8
SKEPTICISM​: I will try to show that everyone, theist or not, should endorse ​SKEPTICISM​.  
 
3. ​THE PRECLUSION ARGUMENT 
In this section, I will introduce and defend three theses, and show that they entail 
SKEPTICISM. 
 
3.1 ​CONNECTION 
Consider the following thesis: 
 
CONNECTION​: if (i) S knows that some event E occurred, (ii) S has no good 
reason to think that there is no state of affairs x connected to E such that S knows 
nothing significant about x, then (iii) S has no good reason to think that there is no 
x connected to E such that the value of x is inscrutable to S. 
 
The inference from (i) and (ii) to (iii) seems rather uncontroversial: if I know nothing significant 
about x, then the value of x will no doubt be inscrutable to me. Indeed, it seems to follow by 
definition. Let us say that a state of affairs is inscrutable just in case we know nothing significant 
about it. Rephrased, then, ​CONNECTION ​states that the value of an inscrutable state of affairs is 
inscrutable. 
8 For arguments to the effect that ​SKEPTICISM​ entails some sort of excessive skepticism, see e.g. Stephen Maitzen 
(2014), Erik Wielenberg (2010), and Hud Hudson (2014b) and (2017) (Hudson is a skeptical theist, but he worries 
about its skeptical implications). For defenses of skeptical theism against these worries, see e.g. Bergmann (2012), 
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009), Michael Rea (2013), and Hendricks (2018b), (forthcoming a), and (forthcoming b). 
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3.2 ​PRECLUSION 
Now consider: 
 
PRECLUSION​: if for some event E that S knows of, she has no good reason to think 
that there is no inscrutable state of affairs connected to E, then S has no good 
reason to think that the value of the states of affairs connected to E that she knows 
of are representative of the value of the states of affairs actually connected to E. 
 
PRECLUSION​, like ​CONNECTION​, seems obviously true: ​if I have no good reason to think that 
there is no state of affairs x such that (a) x is inscrutable and (b) x is connected to E, then I have 
no good reason for ​thinking that all states of affairs connected to E fall within the same range of 
value. To illustrate this, suppose I am considering a set of states of affairs {w, x, y} connected to 
E, as detailed in Figure 1. And suppose further that I have no good reason to think that there is no 
state of affairs, call it v*, connected to E such that the value of v* is inscrutable. 
 
States of 
affairs 
(possibly) 
connected to 
E 
v* w x y 
Value of 
states of 
affairs 
? 15 25 30 
Figure 1 (“?” = the value is inscrutable, and “*” = I have no good reason to think it is 
not connected to E) 
 
The fact that v* is an inscrutable state of affairs means that I have no good reason to think that its 
value falls in the range of {w, x, y}, and if I have no good reason for thinking its value falls in 
that range, then—since I have no good reason to think v* is not connected to E—I have no good 
reason to think {w, x, y} are representative, in respect to value, of the states of affairs actually 
connected to E. Indeed, if I did have good reason to think that the value of v* falls into the range 
of {w, x, y}, it would follow that it is ​not ​an inscrutable state of affairs: if I have a good reason to 
think that the value of v* falls within the range {w, x, y}, then I have at least some idea of its 
value (namely, that it is probably within the range of {w, x, y}), and therefore its value is not 
inscrutable. And hence the inscrutability of v* conjoined with the fact that I have no good reason 
to think that it is not connected to E entails that I have no good reason to think that the value 
range of {w, x, y} is representative of the states of affairs actually connected to E. Crucially, this 
means that I have no good reason for thinking that the total value of the set of states of affairs 
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connected to E falls within any particular range, and this means that the total value of the set of 
states of affairs connected to E is inscrutable: since I have no good reason for thinking that v* is 
not connected to E and it is inscrutable—its value could be incredibly high, middling, or 
incredibly low—I have no good reason for thinking that the total value of the set of states of 
affairs connected to E falls within any particular range. For example, suppose v* actually obtains 
and is actually connected to E. Suppose further that the value of v* is incredibly high, say 
10^​10,000​.  If that is the case, then, assuming the only other states of affairs connected to E are w, 
x, and y, the total value of the set of states of affairs produced by E (i.e. {v*, w, x, y}) is 
incredibly high, and is not reflected by the value of {w, x, y}. This, again, is why ​SKEPTICISM​ is 
held to undermine arguments from evil. (See section 2.)  
 
3.3 ​EVENT 
Finally, consider the following thesis:  
 
EVENT​: For any event (good, evil, ordinary) E, we have no good reason to think 
that there are no inscrutable states of affairs (causally) connected to E.  9
 
EVENT​, I take it, is fairly obvious: while some event we know of may appear to have no 
connection to inscrutable states of affairs, this does not justify the conclusion that there are no 
such states of affairs connected to it: we have no good reason for thinking that some event we 
know of is not causally connected to an inscrutable state of affairs. This is because many 
connections are separated by long periods of time, making it more difficult to perceive them. For 
example, there is a long period of time between smoking (consistently) and getting cancer, which 
makes it more difficult to see the connection between these states of affairs.  
9 As stated earlier (footnote 5), ​SKEPTICISM ​and my argument can be run in terms of logical connections between 
goods and evils. Read this way, ​EVENT ​claims that for any event E, we have no good reason to think that there are no 
inscrutable states of affairs ​logically ​connected to E. Call this revision ​EVENT*. EVENT* ​seems clearly true. This is 
because humans are not the types of beings that, if there is a logical connection between states of affairs, they will 
probably know about it. Indeed, as illustrated in my discussion of ​a posteriori ​necessary truths below, humans are 
not the types of beings that are good at identifying logical connections—logical connections are difficult to discern 
for humans. So, our lack of knowledge of an inscrutable state of affairs logically connected to E certainly is not a 
good reason to think there are no such states of affairs. Additionally, events are often complex, making their logical 
connections even more difficult to discern. This becomes clearer when we consider ​a posteriori ​necessary truths. 
For example, if genetic essentialism is true—the thesis (very roughly) that a person S could not have existed with 
different genetic makeup—then there is a logical connection between any event involving S and the state of affairs 
consisting of her genetic makeup. Or, suppose that the mind-brain identity theory is right, and to be in e.g. ​pain ​is to 
have brain state B. If this is the case, then there is a logical connection between any event that includes pain and B. 
The truth value of these theses (i.e. genetic essentialism and the mind-brain identity theory) is not obvious, which 
casts doubt on just what logical connections between events and states of affairs there are. This problem gets worse 
considering numerous other epistemically possible ​a posteriori ​necessary truths. Additionally, it is difficult to 
discern logical connections between present events and past states of affairs and equally difficult to discern logical 
connections between present events and future (or present but far removed from human experience) states of affairs. 
This all strongly supports​ EVENT*​. 
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Moreover, many connections have not yet occurred (such as the connections between 
current events and future states of affairs), and many current events are connected to states of 
affairs that have obtained in the past, making it all the more difficult to discern them. For 
example, World War II ended the way it did largely due to Winston Churchill’s actions. That 
particular state of affairs—the end of World War II—was connected to an event that is easy to 
gloss over: the position that Lady Randolph Churchill slept in on the night Winston Churchill 
was conceived. Had Lady Randolph Churchill slept in any other position, the route of the 
spermatozoa would very likely have been altered, which would make it very likely that her son 
would have different chromosomes, making it such that her son would have been very different 
from the Winston Churchill we came to know, and this would make it very likely that World 
War II would have ended differently. When the end of World War II was current, it would have 
no doubt been difficult to see how that state of affairs was connected to the earlier, seemingly 
insignificant event of Lady Randolph Churchill sleeping in such and such a position. (I borrow 
this example from (Durston 2000: 66.) Clearly, then, it can be difficult to perceive connections of 
present events with past states of affairs.  
 
Furthermore, some connections are complex and therefore difficult for humans to 
perceive. For example, consider again smoking: many years ago, it wasn’t obvious to anyone 
that smoking was connected to getting cancer: the connection between smoking and getting 
cancer was complex, and took some time to discern. There are no doubt other connections 
between states of affairs that are complex and difficult (or perhaps impossible) for humans to 
discern. Because of the complexity of connections, the fact that we cannot perceive (many) 
future connections, and the fact that it is difficult to discern connections between a current event 
and a past state of affairs connected to it,  we have no good reason to think that there aren’t any 
inscrutable states of affairs connected to any event. (Indeed, since we know that for any event we 
observe, there are very likely distant (past and future) states of affairs connected to it that we 
know nothing about, we have good reason to think that there are inscrutable states of affairs 
connected to it). And hence, ​EVENT ​is secured. 
 
3.4 From ​CONNECTION​, ​PRECLUSION​, and ​EVENT​ to ​SKEPTICISM 
EVENT​ and ​CONNECTION​ entail that for any event E we know of, we have no good reason for 
thinking that there are not inscrutable states of affairs connected to E. However, this means that 
PRECLUSION​ holds for ​all ​E we know of, meaning that for ​any ​E, we have no good reason to 
think that value of the states of affairs that we know are connected to E are representative. But, 
of course, this is just a generalized way of stating ​SKEPTICISM​: “instances of evil” referred to in 
SKEPTICISM ​are just particular events, and ​EVENT​ and ​CONNECTION​, therefore, entail that for any 
instance of evil (event), we have no good reason to think that there are not inscrutable states of 
affairs connected to it. And from this, ​PRECLUSION​ entails that we have no good reason to think 
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that the value of the states of affairs that we know are connected to some instance of evil are 
representative, in respect to value, of the states of affairs that are actually connected to said 
instance of evil. And this means that we have no good reason to think that the value of the states 
of affairs we know are connected to E are representative of the value of the states of affairs 
actually connected to E. And hence ​EVENT, CONNECTION, ​and​ PRECLUSION ​entail​ SKEPTICISM 
which, as we saw above, undermines arguments from evil. More formally, we may put this 
argument as follows: 
 
THE PRECLUSION ARGUMENT 
 
(3) For any E we know of, we have no good reason for thinking that there are not 
inscrutable states of affairs connected to E. (From ​EVENT​ and ​CONNECTION​.) 
(4) Therefore, for any E we know, we have no good reason to think that that the 
states of affairs we know are connected to E are representative in respect to value 
of the actual states of affairs connected to E. (From (3) and ​PRECLUSION​.) 
(5) Therefore, ​SKEPTICISM​. (From (4).) 
 
To deny ​THE PRECLUSION ARGUMENT​, one must deny ​EVENT​, ​CONNECTION​, or ​PRECLUSION​. 
But this is an unenvious position to be in since these theses seem clearly true. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, I have used ​THE PRECLUSION ARGUMENT​ to show that​ SKEPTICISM ​is true. 
Critics of skeptical theism, therefore, owe us an explanation for why ​THE PRECLUSION 
ARGUMENT​ fails.  10
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